Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument
Uriah Kriegel
Abstract
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Uriah Kriegel
Abstract
Open-access reader
The word ‘consciousness’ is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it isnota term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I am going to discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities of the word ‘consciousness,’ I will introduce a term of art:intransitive self-consciousness.As the term suggests, the phenomenon I have in mind is a kind of self-consciousness, or self-awareness.
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The word ‘consciousness’ is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it isnota term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I am going to discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities of the word ‘consciousness,’ I will introduce a term of art:intransitive self-consciousness.As the term suggests, the phenomenon I have in mind is a kind of self-consciousness, or self-awareness.
Key concepts: Consciousness, Word (group theory), Argument (complex analysis), Self-consciousness, Phenomenon, Term (time), Epistemology, Psychology