ScholarLens Back to search
2007•RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsOpen access

Agency Theory and Work Incentives

Maurizio Lisciandra

Open full text 1 citations

Abstract

Agency Theory and Work Incentives (by Maurizio Lisciandra) - ABSTRACT: This paper is an extensive review of agency theory applied to labour incentives. It introduces a generalised principal-agent model that goes through a certain degree of critical assessment. The analysis of the optimality within the trade-off of insurance against incentives is enriched by bringing in the contribution of established extensions and new approaches to the agency theory and, to a larger extent, labour incentives. Keywords: Agency Theory, Incentives, Labour Contracts

Open-access reader

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Agency Theory and Work Incentives (by Maurizio Lisciandra) - ABSTRACT: This paper is an extensive review of agency theory applied to labour incentives. It introduces a generalised principal-agent model that goes through a certain degree of critical assessment. The analysis of the optimality within the trade-off of insurance against incentives is enriched by bringing in the contribution of established extensions and new approaches to the agency theory and, to a larger extent, labour incentives. Keywords: Agency Theory, Incentives, Labour Contracts

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 1 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Agency Theory and Work Incentives (by Maurizio Lisciandra) - ABSTRACT: This paper is an extensive review of agency theory applied to labour incentives. It introduces a generalised principal-agent model that goes through a certain degree of critical assessment. The analysis of the optimality within the trade-off of insurance against incentives is enriched by bringing in the contribution of established extensions and new approaches to the agency theory and, to a larger extent, labour incentives. Keywords: Agency Theory, Incentives, Labour Contracts

Key concepts: Incentive, Agency (philosophy), Principal–agent problem, Principal (computer security), Work (physics), Economics, Agency cost, Microeconomics

Related papers

Related paper 1Related paper 2Related paper 3
Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Agency Theory and Work Incentives — Research Paper | ScholarLens