Intencionalidad e inactualidad en la fenomenología

Intentionality and inactuality in Phenomenology According to Paul Ricoeur, Phenomenology and Hermeneutics must be understood one with each other. Contemporary Hermeneutics sees in the first philosophical school certain limitations; however, the latter cannot unattend certain features from the phenomenological agenda. For instance, a) the notion of “sense”, b) the “phenomenological reduction” as “resignification,” or c) the phenomenology of perception, continued as “hermeneutics of historical experience”. In general terms, Ricoeur analyzes the form in which certain idealistic aspects of the Husserlian phenomenology, among them “intentionality,” has been surpassed by hermeneutical ontology; accordingly, this notion remains imprisoned in the subject-object model. Nevertheless, intentionality entails certain margin of potentiality that is the condition of thought, that is to say, the “self” of the human being is a form that holds in himself an infinity of forms, beyond the model in which Ricoeur wants to locate it. Key words: Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, intentionality, inactuality, conscionsness, pure-self, pertinence, evidence, significance.