Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule

Is an extra-judicial verbal admission by a party to an action receivable in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule?That rule generally excludes extra-judicial statements when offered to prove the truth of the matter therein asserted.If admissions are received for any other purpose, or if they are received not as evidence, but as substitutes for proof, the query should be answered in the negative.Formal judicial admissions dispense with the necessity of evidence.They take the matter out of the domain of proof, so that neither court nor jury need make any finding with respect to them from the evidence.If a party in his pleading, or by stipulation, or by a formal declaration in open court admits the truth of any allegation, then so long as the pleading remains without amendment or so long as the admission stands unretracted, the allegation, for the purposes of the case, is taken as true by the court and jury, and no testimony by the admitter tending to show its untruth will ordinarily be received or considered.It has been suggested that extra-judicial admissions are to be received on the same basis "as a substitute for the ordinary and legal proof; in virtue of the direct consent and waiver of the party."'"An admission," it has been said, "is a fact to be proved by evidence, not evidence to prove a fact.' 2 These expressions appear to indicate that whenever a party is shown to have made an extra-judicial admission, he must be deemed to have waived proof by his opponent of the matter thus ' Greenleaf, Evidence (Ist ed., 1842) sec.16g: "Such evidence seems, therefore, more properly admissible as a substitute for the ordinary and legal proof, either in virtue of the direct consent and waiver of the party, as in the case of explicit and solemn admissions; or on grounds of public -policy and convenience, as in the case of those implied from assumed character, acquiescence or conduct" The learned author does not amplify his views, nor does he, in dealing with specific cases of admissions, explain in what way, if at all, the application of this theory would produce results differing from those produced by regarding admissions as exceptions to the hearsay rule.None of the editors of the later editions of the treatise make any comment upon this section, except Dean Wigmore, and he rejects its theory in favor of the theory explained infra, which regards extra-judicial admissions as merely impeaching evidence.Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed.1899) sec.i69.Mr. Pitt Taylor incorporated the quoted statement verbatim in the first paragraph of the fourteenth chapter of his work on Evidence, without comment or explanation.'Wharton, Evidence (1877) sec.1075; Hammersley, J. in State v. Willis (1894) 71 Conn.293, 3o8, 41 AtL 820, 823.[355]'If the former interpretation is accepted, the extra-judicial admission would seem to to be more potent than the judicial admission, for the latter, when improvidently made, may usually be amended or withdrawn.An extra-judicial verbal admission includes any statement made by a party inconsistent with the position taken by him in the action.It is perfectly clear upon the authorities that extra-judicial admissions are not conclusive upon the admitter, as was necessarily known to both the learned commentators above mentioned.It seems only reasonable, then, to conclude that when they spoke of admissions as a substitute for proof, they must have been using the term, "admission," to express the concept of waiver of proof, and not as designating merely the extra-judicial statement of the admitter.'Hammersley J. in State v. Willis, supra note 2. It must be remembered that this statement by the learned justice was pure dictum.The question before the court was the admissibility of a confession, which had been objected to because involuntary.The term "admission" is applied throughout the opinion to the confession.5 Heane v. Rogers (1829, K. B.) 9 B. & C. 577; see 2 Wharton, op.cit., sec.7o77 and cases cited.' Cases cited infra note 9. Greenleaf, Evidence (i6th ed., 1899) sec.i69.'See (920) 34 HARv.L. REv.205; I Wigmore, Evidence (19o4) sec.267.