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2012•Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)Open access

Practically Implementable Auction for a Good with Countervailing Positive Externalities

Kornpob Bhirombhakdi, Tanapong Potipiti

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Abstract

This study theoretically presents a new auction design called "take-or-give auction." The auction solves the free-rider problem in the case of two symmetric and risk-neutral bidders competing for a good with countervailing positive externalities. The auction makes efficient allocation. Moreover, the extension of the auction by addition some rules maximizes the seller's expected revenue.

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What this paper is about

This study theoretically presents a new auction design called "take-or-give auction." The auction solves the free-rider problem in the case of two symmetric and risk-neutral bidders competing for a good with countervailing positive externalities. The auction makes efficient allocation. Moreover, the extension of the auction by addition some rules maximizes the seller's expected revenue.

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Available abstract

This study theoretically presents a new auction design called "take-or-give auction." The auction solves the free-rider problem in the case of two symmetric and risk-neutral bidders competing for a good with countervailing positive externalities. The auction makes efficient allocation. Moreover, the extension of the auction by addition some rules maximizes the seller's expected revenue.

Key concepts: Revenue equivalence, Auction theory, Pooling, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, Auction algorithm, Microeconomics, Vickrey auction, Generalized second-price auction

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