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Naval Arms Control: A Post-Cold War Reappraisal

Paul Curtis Brown

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Abstract

Examines the field of naval arms control in the post-Cold War world. Author postulates that fundamental changes in the geo-strategic environment require the development of new criteria to evaluate alternative security policies for the future. Introduces a cognitive flow chart for post-Cold War decision making which depicts naval arms control as a FIFTH ORDER question, which awaits consensus answers for higher political decisions. A "snapshot" of US participation in naval arms control is presented which highlights the fact that the US Navy does not receive enough credit for vast amounts of naval arms control already underway. Recommends that future naval arms control not be undertaken by negotiated treaty. Evaluates naval arms control alternatives based upon their potential applicability to President Bush's new national security strategy and likely congressional test for the strategy. Concludes that a unique opportunity now exists to synthesize international naval arms control policy with the critical domestic priorities of the American agenda. RECOMMENDS A NEW REGIME OF NAVAL CSBMs BE ADOPTED NOW (CONSISTING OF JUNIOR OFFICER EXCHANGES AND INCREASED NAVAL PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS). Postulates that this arms control philosophy will best serve the American public and will also enhance the Navy's political capital for future resource allocation decisions.

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Examines the field of naval arms control in the post-Cold War world. Author postulates that fundamental changes in the geo-strategic environment require the development of new criteria to evaluate alternative security policies for the future. Introduces a cognitive flow chart for post-Cold War decision making which depicts naval arms control as a FIFTH ORDER question, which awaits consensus answers for higher political decisions. A "snapshot" of US participation in naval arms control is presented which highlights the fact that the US Navy does not receive enough credit for vast amounts of naval arms control already underway. Recommends that future naval arms control not be undertaken by negotiated treaty. Evaluates naval arms control alternatives based upon their potential applicability to President Bush's new national security strategy and likely congressional test for the strategy. Concludes that a unique opportunity now exists to synthesize international naval arms control policy with the critical domestic priorities of the American agenda. RECOMMENDS A NEW REGIME OF NAVAL CSBMs BE ADOPTED NOW (CONSISTING OF JUNIOR OFFICER EXCHANGES AND INCREASED NAVAL PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS). Postulates that this arms control philosophy will best serve the American public and will also enhance the Navy's political capital for future resource allocation decisions.

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Examines the field of naval arms control in the post-Cold War world. Author postulates that fundamental changes in the geo-strategic environment require the development of new criteria to evaluate alternative security policies for the future. Introduces a cognitive flow chart for post-Cold War decision making which depicts naval arms control as a FIFTH ORDER question, which awaits consensus answers for higher political decisions. A "snapshot" of US participation in naval arms control is presented which highlights the fact that the US Navy does not receive enough credit for vast amounts of naval arms control already underway. Recommends that future naval arms control not be undertaken by negotiated treaty. Evaluates naval arms control alternatives based upon their potential applicability to President Bush's new national security strategy and likely congressional test for the strategy. Concludes that a unique opportunity now exists to synthesize international naval arms control policy with the critical domestic priorities of the American agenda. RECOMMENDS A NEW REGIME OF NAVAL CSBMs BE ADOPTED NOW (CONSISTING OF JUNIOR OFFICER EXCHANGES AND INCREASED NAVAL PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS). Postulates that this arms control philosophy will best serve the American public and will also enhance the Navy's political capital for future resource allocation decisions.

Key concepts: Navy, Arms control, Cold war, Politics, North Atlantic Treaty, National security, Political science, Command and control

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