Apprendi V. New Jersey: A True "Watershed" Ruling
Heather Jones
Abstract
Heather Jones
Abstract
I. Introduction Late one night in 1998, R.C. asked Jay Grossman to give her a ride home from a bar, which he agreed to do.1 She did not know Grossman, but she was intoxicated and had been left at the bar by her ride.2 R.C. remembered Grossman driving her to her friend's house.3 The next thing she remembered, Grossman was raping her in a field.4 She attempted to fight him off, but he beat her severely and strangled her until she pretended to be dead.5 A jury found Grossman guilty of, among other things, first-degree criminal sexual conduct.6 Under Minnesota law, criminal sexual conduct carried a maximum penalty of thirty years in prison, but the judge sentenced Grossman to forty years.7 How could he do this? Under Minnesota law at the time, if a judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant guilty of criminal sexual conduct was also a patterned sex offender, the defendant could receive a sentence of up to forty years in prison.8 The judge in Grossman's case made this finding after reviewing a psychological and psychosexual evaluation.9 Grossman, then, was sentenced to an additional ten years in prison for something that had neither been proved beyond a reasonable doubt nor submitted to a jury. Prior to June 2000, this approach to sentencing was not unusual. Under certain state and federal statutes, the prosecution was only required to prove facts that could increase a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory IMAGE FORMULA3 maximum to a judge by a preponderance of the evidence.10 In Apprendi v. New Jersey,11 the Supreme Court held that this practice was unconstitutional. Now, to comply with standards of due process, any fact that increases the penalty for a conviction beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury that finds the relevant facts beyond a reasonable doubt.12 Grossman was appealing his conviction and sentence when Apprendi was decided. Following Apprendi, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that Grossman's sentence did indeed violate the Constitution, so his case was remanded for resentencing.13 Grossman benefited from the Apprendi decision because his conviction was not yet final when Apprendi was decided. However, as the law stands now, any offender's conviction that became final before the Apprendi decision will not receive the benefit of the decision. This is because the Supreme Court has decided that, subject to two exceptions, an offender's conviction will be reviewed according to the controlling law at the time his conviction became final.14 If Apprendi does not meet one of those exceptions (as most courts have determined that it does not15), someone in a position similar to Grossman's, but whose conviction became final even a day before Apprendi was decided, will not receive the benefit of that decision. Those defendants will spend additional time in prison beyond the statutory maximum, based on a judge's finding that was made by a preponderance of the evidence. As noted above, Supreme Court rulings will only be applied retroactively to final convictions in certain circumstances. The exception applicable to Apprendi, set out in Teague v. Lane,16 is applied so strictly that the Court has yet to apply the exception to a case.17 Because of the serious implications of sentences handed down in violation of Apprendi, the Apprendi decision should be applied retroactively.18 If, however, the Court IMAGE FORMULA5 holds Apprendi cannot meet Teague's requirements, it is unlikely that they will ever find any case that will do so, and Teague's usefulness should be seriously questioned. Part II of this Note discusses the Apprendi decision, some of the issues left unresolved by the decision, and some of the procedural hurdles that defendants raising Apprendi claims on collateral review may face. Part III looks at the Teague opinion and its requirements for a decision to be applied retroactively. …
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I. Introduction Late one night in 1998, R.C. asked Jay Grossman to give her a ride home from a bar, which he agreed to do.1 She did not know Grossman, but she was intoxicated and had been left at the bar by her ride.2 R.C. remembered Grossman driving her to her friend's house.3 The next thing she remembered, Grossman was raping her in a field.4 She attempted to fight him off, but he beat her severely and strangled her until she pretended to be dead.5 A jury found Grossman guilty of, among other things, first-degree criminal sexual conduct.6 Under Minnesota law, criminal sexual conduct carried a maximum penalty of thirty years in prison, but the judge sentenced Grossman to forty years.7 How could he do this? Under Minnesota law at the time, if a judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant guilty of criminal sexual conduct was also a patterned sex offender, the defendant could receive a sentence of up to forty years in prison.8 The judge in Grossman's case made this finding after reviewing a psychological and psychosexual evaluation.9 Grossman, then, was sentenced to an additional ten years in prison for something that had neither been proved beyond a reasonable doubt nor submitted to a jury. Prior to June 2000, this approach to sentencing was not unusual. Under certain state and federal statutes, the prosecution was only required to prove facts that could increase a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory IMAGE FORMULA3 maximum to a judge by a preponderance of the evidence.10 In Apprendi v. New Jersey,11 the Supreme Court held that this practice was unconstitutional. Now, to comply with standards of due process, any fact that increases the penalty for a conviction beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury that finds the relevant facts beyond a reasonable doubt.12 Grossman was appealing his conviction and sentence when Apprendi was decided. Following Apprendi, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that Grossman's sentence did indeed violate the Constitution, so his case was remanded for resentencing.13 Grossman benefited from the Apprendi decision because his conviction was not yet final when Apprendi was decided. However, as the law stands now, any offender's conviction that became final before the Apprendi decision will not receive the benefit of the decision. This is because the Supreme Court has decided that, subject to two exceptions, an offender's conviction will be reviewed according to the controlling law at the time his conviction became final.14 If Apprendi does not meet one of those exceptions (as most courts have determined that it does not15), someone in a position similar to Grossman's, but whose conviction became final even a day before Apprendi was decided, will not receive the benefit of that decision. Those defendants will spend additional time in prison beyond the statutory maximum, based on a judge's finding that was made by a preponderance of the evidence. As noted above, Supreme Court rulings will only be applied retroactively to final convictions in certain circumstances. The exception applicable to Apprendi, set out in Teague v. Lane,16 is applied so strictly that the Court has yet to apply the exception to a case.17 Because of the serious implications of sentences handed down in violation of Apprendi, the Apprendi decision should be applied retroactively.18 If, however, the Court IMAGE FORMULA5 holds Apprendi cannot meet Teague's requirements, it is unlikely that they will ever find any case that will do so, and Teague's usefulness should be seriously questioned. Part II of this Note discusses the Apprendi decision, some of the issues left unresolved by the decision, and some of the procedural hurdles that defendants raising Apprendi claims on collateral review may face. Part III looks at the Teague opinion and its requirements for a decision to be applied retroactively. …
Key concepts: Grossman, Jury, Law, Prison, Statute, Reasonable doubt, Life imprisonment, Psychology