Internalizing Technological Externality under Default Risk
Hiroshi Futamura
Abstract
Open-access reader
Hiroshi Futamura
Abstract
Open-access reader
In this short article, we investigate the effects of public policies on the market equilibrium resource allocation in an economy that is affected by two sources of market failure; (i) positive technological externalities, and (ii) indebted firms' incentive to default. The Priority Production System employed by the Japanese government during the reconstruction period after World War II could achieve the first-best outcome in such an environment.
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In this short article, we investigate the effects of public policies on the market equilibrium resource allocation in an economy that is affected by two sources of market failure; (i) positive technological externalities, and (ii) indebted firms' incentive to default. The Priority Production System employed by the Japanese government during the reconstruction period after World War II could achieve the first-best outcome in such an environment.
Key concepts: Externality, Incentive, Market failure, Economics, Production (economics), Government (linguistics), Outcome (game theory), General equilibrium theory