On political judgement

Characterising political judgement This book presents a new account of the limited number of basic forms of political judgement, showing how they work with and against each other in shaping decision-making. It offers a fresh causal explanation of these styles of judgement, although it draws upon classical works. Politically to judge is to select and to commit to action, but it involves much that comes beforehand. Political judgement is the thought style exhibited in and shaping the pattern of political decision-making. It can only be measured over a series of decisions that decision-makers consider causally related. A thought style is the manner in which ideas, categories, propositions, feelings, etc., are believed, rejected, construed, framed, classified, used and felt. For example, propositions may be believed with greater or less dogmatism; emotions may be felt with greater or less complexity and ambivalence; categories and their boundaries may be marked with greater or less rigidity, with greater or less exaggeration of differences between cases within and beyond a category, allowing for more or for less negotiation, hybridity, etc.; aims and intentions may be pursued more or less tolerantly of compromise. Style is contrasted with the content of thought, which consists in descriptive, explanatory or prescriptive propositions accepted. Political ideology is a key aspect of content. Indeed, this book shows that people with diametrically opposed ideologies may exhibit similar thought styles; conversely, ideological allies may think in quite contrasting styles.