Airpower in the Context of a Dysfunctional Joint Doctrine

Abstract : This important research deals with the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms-our joint doctrine. The author argues that the current doctrine development process has become a zero-sum game driven by the chair man of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring joint doctrine to be 'authoritative.' The resultant interservice competition has produced a keystone joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, that unfortunately has been corrupted to serve parochial service interests. This research focuses on that document and the impact it has on how we think about high intensity, conventional combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corruption of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to serve parochial land force interests. The author shows in detail how definitions and terms have destroyed the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities solely to the support of surface maneuver commanders. The author believes the lack of intellectual integrity of Joint Pub 3-0 debases the entire joint doctrine process: it must be corrected. The author's recommended solution is to revise the joint definitions of maneuver and interdiction to preclude their ownership by a specific type of military organization and to give the Air Force its rightful and earned place at the doctrine table. A rewrite of Joint Pub 3-0 is required to reflect joint force capabilities for full-dimensional operations, not simply land force dominance of the entire battlefield. Sea, air, and space force dominance deserve equal discussion in this keystone joint operations doctrine. The author also calls for the JCS to review the basic paradigm used in joint doctrine.