The St. Louis Flood: Some Observations On Warning And Pre-Impact Disaster Response

During the latter part of March continuing to the end of April 1973, three \nflood crests on the Mississippi River caused property damage and disruption in \nthree counties surrounding St. Louis, Missouri and, to some extent, in the city itself. While press reports seemed to indicate that the actual impact on the \ncity was not major, there did appear to be a mobilization of organizations in the \ncity in preparation for and response to such an event. On the basis of press \nreports and other information, the Disaster Research Center (DRC) sent a two-man \nfield team to St. Louis. The team stayed two days, May 3 and 4, concentrating \non flood-associated activities in St. Louis and the three surrounding counties \nand attempting to get answers to the following questions: (1) If a disaster had occurred, in what way was the community response \ncoordinated in two emergency task areas: \nwarning and pre-impact activities.(2) What role did the local civil defense (CD) organization play in the \ncoordination of warning and pre-impact activities; \n(3) Did the flood situation and/or the CD flood activities have any effect \non how the community and the community organizations viewed CD's \nsaliency and legitimacy as a viable emergency organization?