I Have Federal Pleading All Figured Out

The primary purpose of this Article is twofold.First, the Article attempts to ease the confusion in this area by explaining the meaning of Twombly and Iqbal and identifying their place in the broader procedural context.Second, this Article attempts to show that some of the criticism directed toward these decisions might be unfounded.In its attempt to achieve this purpose, this Article will reach a number of conclusions, many of which run counter to the conventional thinking on this subject:1.The Supreme Court's rulings in Twombly and Iqbal probably did not result in a significant change in the overall federal-court pleading scheme.Rather, these decisions have brought increased attention to a plaintiff's obligations in the pleadings stage and have invigorated the use of the motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," 8 much as the Supreme Court's decisions in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 9 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 10 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.v. Zenith Radio Corp. 11 invigorated summary-judgment practice.12 2.The word "plausible" as used by the Supreme Court in connection with a plaintiff's allegations cannot be construed as meaning "believable."Rather, it must refer only to the factual sufficiency of a complaint.This means that a factually suspicious (or even frivolous), but otherwise factually and legally sufficient, complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.3. The venerable passage from Conley v. Gibson 13 that was "retired" by the Court in Twombly 14 -"that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief" 15 -appears to be dicta, and in any event related not to the factual sufficiency of a plaintiff's allegations, but rather to the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claim.Article, both for clarity and because plaintiffs are probably the most impacted by these decisions.For similar reasons, this Article uses "defendant," rather than "defending party," to refer to those parties responding to a claiming party's claims.8 FED.R. CIV.P. 12(b)(6).9 477 U.S. 317 (1986).10 477 U.S. 242 (1986).11 475 U.S. 574 (1986).12 See generally FED.R. CIV.P. 56 (providing the federal standard for summary judgment).13 355 U.S. 41 (1957).14 Bell Atl.Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007) (observing that the oftquoted "no set of facts" language in Conley consistently fails to "be understood in light of the opinion's preceding summary of the complaint's concrete allegations, which the [Conley] Court quite reasonably understood as amply stating a claim for relief" ).15 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.