Supply chain coordination by revenue-sharing contract with fuzzy demand
Junyan Wang, Ruiqing Zhao, Wansheng Tang
Abstract
Junyan Wang, Ruiqing Zhao, Wansheng Tang
Abstract
In this paper, we study revenue-sharing contract in a supply chain with fuzzy demand. Under such a contract, a retailer pays a supplier a wholesale price for each unit purchased, plus a percentage of the revenue generated by the retailer that is determined by retailer's purchase quantity and price. We address the contract under two kinds of fuzzy demands which depend on the retailer's selling price based on game theory. The effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract under fuzzy demands is proved.
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In this paper, we study revenue-sharing contract in a supply chain with fuzzy demand. Under such a contract, a retailer pays a supplier a wholesale price for each unit purchased, plus a percentage of the revenue generated by the retailer that is determined by retailer's purchase quantity and price. We address the contract under two kinds of fuzzy demands which depend on the retailer's selling price based on game theory. The effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract under fuzzy demands is proved.
Key concepts: Revenue sharing, Supply chain, Business, Revenue, Microeconomics, Fuzzy logic, Contract management, Revenue center