1995Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsRequires access

Why we have to Keep the Bomb

Kathleen C. Bailey

Open publisher page 15 citations

Abstract

The United States holds contradictory policies which are on a collision course. While it repeatedly commits to the goal of total nuclear disarmament, it depends on nuclear deterrence for security. In the past, US policymakers have avoided rectifying the contradiction by labeling disarmament as a long-term goal. However, this is increasingly unacceptable to non-nuclear weapon states, who rightly observe that the US is not seriously willing to undertake total nuclear disarmament as its part of the bargain under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Some states are so disgruntled that they propose linking their continued commitment to nonproliferation to setting a timetable for nuclear weapons states to dismantle their arsenals. Linking the extension of the NPT with a requirement for a timetable for nuclear disarmament is not constructive. Disarmament will not eliminate the risk of nuclear war, it will do little or nothing to prevent nuclear proliferation, and it will not cement the end of the Cold War. It will fulfill the Article VI NPT obligation and superficially end discrimination inherent in that treaty - but at a very high price. Because there is now no effective verification for nuclear disarmament, potential proliferants might be inspired to pursue nuclear weapons, andmore » those nations that already have them might decide to secretly retain them.« less

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What this paper is about

The United States holds contradictory policies which are on a collision course. While it repeatedly commits to the goal of total nuclear disarmament, it depends on nuclear deterrence for security. In the past, US policymakers have avoided rectifying the contradiction by labeling disarmament as a long-term goal. However, this is increasingly unacceptable to non-nuclear weapon states, who rightly observe that the US is not seriously willing to undertake total nuclear disarmament as its part of the bargain under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Some states are so disgruntled that they propose linking their continued commitment to nonproliferation to setting a timetable for nuclear weapons states to dismantle their arsenals. Linking the extension of the NPT with a requirement for a timetable for nuclear disarmament is not constructive. Disarmament will not eliminate the risk of nuclear war, it will do little or nothing to prevent nuclear proliferation, and it will not cement the end of the Cold War. It will fulfill the Article VI NPT obligation and superficially end discrimination inherent in that treaty - but at a very high price. Because there is now no effective verification for nuclear disarmament, potential proliferants might be inspired to pursue nuclear weapons, andmore » those nations that already have them might decide to secretly retain them.« less

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Available abstract

The United States holds contradictory policies which are on a collision course. While it repeatedly commits to the goal of total nuclear disarmament, it depends on nuclear deterrence for security. In the past, US policymakers have avoided rectifying the contradiction by labeling disarmament as a long-term goal. However, this is increasingly unacceptable to non-nuclear weapon states, who rightly observe that the US is not seriously willing to undertake total nuclear disarmament as its part of the bargain under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Some states are so disgruntled that they propose linking their continued commitment to nonproliferation to setting a timetable for nuclear weapons states to dismantle their arsenals. Linking the extension of the NPT with a requirement for a timetable for nuclear disarmament is not constructive. Disarmament will not eliminate the risk of nuclear war, it will do little or nothing to prevent nuclear proliferation, and it will not cement the end of the Cold War. It will fulfill the Article VI NPT obligation and superficially end discrimination inherent in that treaty - but at a very high price. Because there is now no effective verification for nuclear disarmament, potential proliferants might be inspired to pursue nuclear weapons, andmore » those nations that already have them might decide to secretly retain them.« less

Key concepts: Nuclear weapon, Political science, International trade, Computer security, Business, Law, Computer science

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