1992Duke journal of comparative & international lawRequires access

The Japanese View Toward NAFTA and Regional Trade Zones

Luney, R Percy

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Abstract

In the Global Partnership Plan of Action signed in January 1992,' President George Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa came to a fundamental agreement. The United States promised to ensure that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA)2 would enhance global free trade, in accordance with basic principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr),3 and would not lead to the erection of trade barriers for countries outside of the North American market.4 However, without evidence that Japan is opening its markets to North American and European companies, there is little likelihood that President Bush will actually pursue these goals in the face of domestic pressures to adopt more protective trade measures directed at Japan.5 These pressures have mounted over the past ten years, as the United States trade deficit with Japan remains large, while its deficit with Europe has disappeared.6 At the same time, the Japanese have refused to respond to pressure,7 initiated by corporate and political leaders in the United States,' to reform their business practices to correspond to those followed in North America and Europe.9 This refusal, along with

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In the Global Partnership Plan of Action signed in January 1992,' President George Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa came to a fundamental agreement. The United States promised to ensure that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA)2 would enhance global free trade, in accordance with basic principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr),3 and would not lead to the erection of trade barriers for countries outside of the North American market.4 However, without evidence that Japan is opening its markets to North American and European companies, there is little likelihood that President Bush will actually pursue these goals in the face of domestic pressures to adopt more protective trade measures directed at Japan.5 These pressures have mounted over the past ten years, as the United States trade deficit with Japan remains large, while its deficit with Europe has disappeared.6 At the same time, the Japanese have refused to respond to pressure,7 initiated by corporate and political leaders in the United States,' to reform their business practices to correspond to those followed in North America and Europe.9 This refusal, along with

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Available abstract

In the Global Partnership Plan of Action signed in January 1992,' President George Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa came to a fundamental agreement. The United States promised to ensure that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA)2 would enhance global free trade, in accordance with basic principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr),3 and would not lead to the erection of trade barriers for countries outside of the North American market.4 However, without evidence that Japan is opening its markets to North American and European companies, there is little likelihood that President Bush will actually pursue these goals in the face of domestic pressures to adopt more protective trade measures directed at Japan.5 These pressures have mounted over the past ten years, as the United States trade deficit with Japan remains large, while its deficit with Europe has disappeared.6 At the same time, the Japanese have refused to respond to pressure,7 initiated by corporate and political leaders in the United States,' to reform their business practices to correspond to those followed in North America and Europe.9 This refusal, along with

Key concepts: International trade, Free trade agreement, General partnership, Free trade, Political science, Politics, Economics, George (robot)

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