Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law

describing Legal Realism as nominalism).23 See id. at 1371 (" [N]othing is True Law which is not Just . . .." ).24 See id. at 1381-83 (discussing the importance of the power to persuade).25 See id. at 1387 (discussing the legal system as a forum of societal change); see also Thomas W. Bechtler, American Legal Realism Revaluated (describing the law as a "means to ends"), in LAW IN SOCIAL CONTEXT: LIBER AMICORUM HONOURING PROFESSOR LON L. FULLER 3, 20-21 (Thomas W. Bechtler ed., 1977); Harry W. Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61 COLUM.L. REV.799, 809 (1961) ("In realist perspective, choice, decision, and responsibility for decision are central elements for a philosophy of law.");Hessel E. Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM.L. REV.925, 955 (1931) ("It is the faith of empirical legal science that ideals of justice not related to human needs are not true ideals . . ..").26 See HOLMES, The Path of the Law (insisting that "[n]o concrete proposition is self-evident, no matter how ready we may be to accept it . . .."), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 18, at 167, 181; LLEWELLYN, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law (explaining the role of common law as constantly reexamining its precedents to reach the good), in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 167, 211-12; Hessel E. Yntema, Jurisprudence on Parade, 39 MICH.L. REV.1154, 1169 (1941) (discussing justice as a theory focused on "the search for better law").