2013•Supreme Court law reviewOpen access

The Jury Vetting Cases: New Insights on Jury Trials in Criminal Cases?

Vanessa A. MacDonnell

Open full text 0 citations

Abstract

In this paper the author discusses the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in the jury vetting cases of R. v. Yumnu, R. v. Emms and R. v. Davey. The author suggests that while the Supreme Court’s ruling goes a long way toward eliminating the concerns associated with jury vetting, there is a disconnect between the Court’s description of the jury selection process and how counsel tend to think about jury selection in criminal trials. While counsel are limited in their ability to influence the jury selection process, the Court might nevertheless have considered whether a full ban on jury vetting was needed to combat the risk — both real and perceived — that the Crown might act unethically during the jury selection process. The paper also examines whether the Court’s comments about the essential and inalienable features of the jury contribute to our understanding of the right to trial by jury enshrined in section 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Open-access reader

About this research paper

What this paper is about

In this paper the author discusses the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in the jury vetting cases of R. v. Yumnu, R. v. Emms and R. v. Davey. The author suggests that while the Supreme Court’s ruling goes a long way toward eliminating the concerns associated with jury vetting, there is a disconnect between the Court’s description of the jury selection process and how counsel tend to think about jury selection in criminal trials. While counsel are limited in their ability to influence the jury selection process, the Court might nevertheless have considered whether a full ban on jury vetting was needed to combat the risk — both real and perceived — that the Crown might act unethically during the jury selection process. The paper also examines whether the Court’s comments about the essential and inalienable features of the jury contribute to our understanding of the right to trial by jury enshrined in section 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

In this paper the author discusses the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in the jury vetting cases of R. v. Yumnu, R. v. Emms and R. v. Davey. The author suggests that while the Supreme Court’s ruling goes a long way toward eliminating the concerns associated with jury vetting, there is a disconnect between the Court’s description of the jury selection process and how counsel tend to think about jury selection in criminal trials. While counsel are limited in their ability to influence the jury selection process, the Court might nevertheless have considered whether a full ban on jury vetting was needed to combat the risk — both real and perceived — that the Crown might act unethically during the jury selection process. The paper also examines whether the Court’s comments about the essential and inalienable features of the jury contribute to our understanding of the right to trial by jury enshrined in section 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Key concepts: Jury, Vetting, Supreme court, Jury selection, Law, Hung jury, Political science, Jury trial

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
The Jury Vetting Cases: New Insights on Jury Trials in Criminal Cases? — Research Paper | ScholarLens