The Decisionmaking Conference of the California Court of Appeal
John B. Molinari
Abstract
John B. Molinari
Abstract
Dean Roscoe Pound pointed out, over a quarter of a century ago, that the most efficient appellate court is one of three judges.' At about the same time the Honorable Raymond E. Peters,2 then Presiding Justice of Division One bf the three-judge District Court of Appeal of the State of California in the First Appellate District,' determined that it would add not only to the efficiency of his court but also to the quality of its work if the three judges would participate in some sort of an intimate conference prior to oral argument which, through a full and free discussion of the cases, would focus upon each case the combined intelligence of the three judges. When Justice Peters was appointed to the district court of appeal in 1939, the California appellate courts followed a general practice under which the justices obtained their first knowledge of a case at oral argument. The rationale behind this procedure was that the justices could approach each case with a completely open mind and without any preconceived notions about the merits of the case before they heard the argument. But Justice Peters was convinced that the brevity of time necessarily allotted for oral argument made it difficult for the justices operating under this procedure to obtain a proper understanding of the case. He felt strongly that because the judges were not thoroughly familiar with the case at the time of argument-a fact known to the lawyers-both the judges and attorneys had a tendency to become indifferent to oral argument. As a result, oral argument usually consisted of a recital of the facts and the parties' general contentions instead of a detailed discussion of the decisive issues. Justice Peters was also concerned that the prevailing practice according to which one judge prepared the opinion of the court after oral argument, without full discussion with his associaties, had a tendency to produce a one-man decision.' To cope with these
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Dean Roscoe Pound pointed out, over a quarter of a century ago, that the most efficient appellate court is one of three judges.' At about the same time the Honorable Raymond E. Peters,2 then Presiding Justice of Division One bf the three-judge District Court of Appeal of the State of California in the First Appellate District,' determined that it would add not only to the efficiency of his court but also to the quality of its work if the three judges would participate in some sort of an intimate conference prior to oral argument which, through a full and free discussion of the cases, would focus upon each case the combined intelligence of the three judges. When Justice Peters was appointed to the district court of appeal in 1939, the California appellate courts followed a general practice under which the justices obtained their first knowledge of a case at oral argument. The rationale behind this procedure was that the justices could approach each case with a completely open mind and without any preconceived notions about the merits of the case before they heard the argument. But Justice Peters was convinced that the brevity of time necessarily allotted for oral argument made it difficult for the justices operating under this procedure to obtain a proper understanding of the case. He felt strongly that because the judges were not thoroughly familiar with the case at the time of argument-a fact known to the lawyers-both the judges and attorneys had a tendency to become indifferent to oral argument. As a result, oral argument usually consisted of a recital of the facts and the parties' general contentions instead of a detailed discussion of the decisive issues. Justice Peters was also concerned that the prevailing practice according to which one judge prepared the opinion of the court after oral argument, without full discussion with his associaties, had a tendency to produce a one-man decision.' To cope with these
Key concepts: Appeal, Argument (complex analysis), Law, Economic Justice, Supreme court, Political science, Law of the case, Sociology