2009RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsOpen access

Lowest Unique Bid Auctions with Signals

Andrea Gallice

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Abstract

A lowest unique bid auction allocates a good to the agent who submits the lowest bid that is not matched by any other bid.This peculiar auction format is becoming increasingly popular over the Internet.We show that when all the bidders are rational such a selling mechanism can lead to positive pro…ts only if there is a large mismatch between the auctioneer's and the bidders' valuation.On the contrary, the auction becomes highly lucrative if at least some bidders are myopic.In this second case, we analyze the key role played by the existence of some private signals that the seller sends to the bidders about the status of their bids.Data about actual auctions con…rm the pro…tability of the mechanism and the limited rationality of the bidders.

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A lowest unique bid auction allocates a good to the agent who submits the lowest bid that is not matched by any other bid.This peculiar auction format is becoming increasingly popular over the Internet.We show that when all the bidders are rational such a selling mechanism can lead to positive pro…ts only if there is a large mismatch between the auctioneer's and the bidders' valuation.On the contrary, the auction becomes highly lucrative if at least some bidders are myopic.In this second case, we analyze the key role played by the existence of some private signals that the seller sends to the bidders about the status of their bids.Data about actual auctions con…rm the pro…tability of the mechanism and the limited rationality of the bidders.

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Available abstract

A lowest unique bid auction allocates a good to the agent who submits the lowest bid that is not matched by any other bid.This peculiar auction format is becoming increasingly popular over the Internet.We show that when all the bidders are rational such a selling mechanism can lead to positive pro…ts only if there is a large mismatch between the auctioneer's and the bidders' valuation.On the contrary, the auction becomes highly lucrative if at least some bidders are myopic.In this second case, we analyze the key role played by the existence of some private signals that the seller sends to the bidders about the status of their bids.Data about actual auctions con…rm the pro…tability of the mechanism and the limited rationality of the bidders.

Key concepts: Unique bid auction, Common value auction, English auction, Proxy bid, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, Bid shading, Vickrey auction, Microeconomics

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