Constitutionalism and judicial appointment as a means of safeguarding judicial independence in selected African jurisdictions

The beginning of the 1990s saw many African countries embarking on the process of drafting \nnew constitutions as they abandoned independence constitutions. Most of the independence \nconstitutions were perceived as constitutions without constitutionalism and they were \ngenerally blamed for failure of democracy and the rule of law in Africa. \nThe study analyses the state of democracy and constitutionalism and the impact that \ncolonialism had on the African continent. Apart from the spurt of new constitutions adopted, \ndemocracy is growing very slowly in most African states with widespread human rights \nviolations and disregard for the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers, still \nholding the centre stage. \nJudicial independence is an important component of democracy in the modern state. The \nstudy therefore scrutinizes how the principle of judicial independence can be promoted and \nprotected to enhance democracy. One important mechanism which plays a crucial role in \nsafeguarding judicial independence is the way judicial officers are appointed. The study \nselects four countries – Swaziland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa and analyses how \njudicial officers are appointed in these countries in an effort to find an effective and optimal \napproach.The premise of the study is centred on the role of constitutionalism and the process of \nappointing judges as a means of promoting and safeguarding democracy in these selected \ncountries.