1982CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology)Open access

The Core of a Coalitional Production Economy Without Ordered Preferences

Kim C. Border

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Abstract

It is shown that the core of a coalitional production economy with a balanced technology (Bohm [1974]) is nonempty, even if the consumers have preferences which are intransitive, provided the preferences are convex and continuous. Since such preferences cannot be represented by utility functions, this result does not follow from the nonemptiness of the core of a characteristic function game. Rather, the approach is closer to that of Ichiishi's [1981] social coalitional equilibrium.

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It is shown that the core of a coalitional production economy with a balanced technology (Bohm [1974]) is nonempty, even if the consumers have preferences which are intransitive, provided the preferences are convex and continuous. Since such preferences cannot be represented by utility functions, this result does not follow from the nonemptiness of the core of a characteristic function game. Rather, the approach is closer to that of Ichiishi's [1981] social coalitional equilibrium.

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Available abstract

It is shown that the core of a coalitional production economy with a balanced technology (Bohm [1974]) is nonempty, even if the consumers have preferences which are intransitive, provided the preferences are convex and continuous. Since such preferences cannot be represented by utility functions, this result does not follow from the nonemptiness of the core of a characteristic function game. Rather, the approach is closer to that of Ichiishi's [1981] social coalitional equilibrium.

Key concepts: Core (optical fiber), Production (economics), Mathematical economics, Economics, Regular polygon, Function (biology), Microeconomics, Convex function

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