Meeting the Enduring Challenge, United Stated Air Force Basic Doctrine Through 1992

Since the 1920s, the United States Air Force has based much of its doctrine on beliefs in the capabilities of strategic bombing that history has not fully borne out. These beliefs, and a lack of critical, objective analysis of experience, are evident in successive versions of the Air Force manual for basic doctrine. The first part of this thesis reviews these doctrine manuals and Air Force thinking through the 1970s. During the 1970s and 1980s, an increasing number of Air Force officers began to realize these, and other, deficiencies in the service's doctrine. The publication of their criticisms and suggestions in various books, articles, and research studies coincided with the establishment of two Air Force organizations specifically devoted to the study of air power history and doctrine. The combination during the late 1980s of these organizations and the officers who worked in them led to the development of a completely new doctrine manual.