What Is Wrong with the Flat Tax
P.J.N. Sinclair, Thomas I. Renström
Abstract
P.J.N. Sinclair, Thomas I. Renström
Abstract
The simplest flat tax proposals envisage a single marginal tax rate applying on all income. In the context of a simple model where agents vary in ability to earn, we demonstrate (a) that everyone is better off in the long run with an income-tax exemption for investment, than without it, and (b) that, in a static context, the optimal two-rate income tax is Pareto-superior to the optimal single-rate tax, under both Utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare functions.
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The simplest flat tax proposals envisage a single marginal tax rate applying on all income. In the context of a simple model where agents vary in ability to earn, we demonstrate (a) that everyone is better off in the long run with an income-tax exemption for investment, than without it, and (b) that, in a static context, the optimal two-rate income tax is Pareto-superior to the optimal single-rate tax, under both Utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare functions.
Key concepts: Economics, Tax rate, Indirect tax, Context (archaeology), Income tax, Microeconomics, State income tax, Welfare