On the Impossibility of Successful Ontological Arguments
Paul Franceschi
Abstract
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Paul Franceschi
Abstract
Open-access reader
In this paper I present a novel objection to ontological arguments. The argument concerns ontological arguments in general and has the general form of a reductio ad absurdum. Roughly, it rests on the fact that if a sound ontological argument were available, it would contradict the very nature of God. For God aims at maximizing the development of human good qualities (including thus faith) and if a successful ontological argument were available, faith would become unnecessary. Lastly, I review several objections that can be raised against the present argument.
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In this paper I present a novel objection to ontological arguments. The argument concerns ontological arguments in general and has the general form of a reductio ad absurdum. Roughly, it rests on the fact that if a sound ontological argument were available, it would contradict the very nature of God. For God aims at maximizing the development of human good qualities (including thus faith) and if a successful ontological argument were available, faith would become unnecessary. Lastly, I review several objections that can be raised against the present argument.
Key concepts: Reductio ad absurdum, Argument (complex analysis), Impossibility, Epistemology, Ontological argument, Philosophy, Faith, Ontology