Minimalism about Truth, Ethics and

Abstract Issues concerning minimalism about truth are relevant to important matters in metaethics (seeMetaethics): specifically, to questions about the plausibility of expressivist (or non‐cognitivist) accounts of moral judgment (seeNon‐Cognitivism). Historically, expressivists and non‐cognitivists rely on minimalist views of truth to respond to certain criticisms of their view. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that minimalism about truth actuallyunderminesexpressivism and non‐cognitivism. In this essay, after brief introductions to ethical expressivism and minimalism about truth, we distinguish between minimalism about truth and minimalism abouttruth‐aptitude, and explain why it is the latter that is crucial to expressivism's plausibility. We then explain why some philosophers have claimed that minimalism about truth‐aptitude undermines expressivism, while others have claimed that ethical expressivism can wholeheartedly embrace minimalism about truth‐aptitude (seeTruth in Ethics).