Espen R. Moen
Abstract
We introduce strategic wage bargaining in a search equilibrium model. We find that wages respond more an employment and output less to aggreagte shoks than when wages are determined by conventional Nash bargaining. Expectations about the stocks increase the volatility of wages even more.
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We introduce strategic wage bargaining in a search equilibrium model. We find that wages respond more an employment and output less to aggreagte shoks than when wages are determined by conventional Nash bargaining. Expectations about the stocks increase the volatility of wages even more.
Key concepts: Wage bargaining, Economics, Bargaining problem, Wage, Volatility (finance), Microeconomics, Strategic interaction, Nash equilibrium