Washington's Partial Veto Power: Judicial Construction of Article III, Section 12
Heidi A. Irvin
Abstract
Open-access reader
Heidi A. Irvin
Abstract
Open-access reader
This Note recommends that the separate subject test employed by Washington courts in reviewing the constitutional validity of partial vetoes be abandoned like the affirmative-negative test before it. In the alternative, the Constitution should be amended to remove any perceived need for a subjective judicial test. As a last-choice solution to the problem of uncertainty and inefficiency in the legislative process, the legislature should use its override powers more extensively.
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This Note recommends that the separate subject test employed by Washington courts in reviewing the constitutional validity of partial vetoes be abandoned like the affirmative-negative test before it. In the alternative, the Constitution should be amended to remove any perceived need for a subjective judicial test. As a last-choice solution to the problem of uncertainty and inefficiency in the legislative process, the legislature should use its override powers more extensively.
Key concepts: Veto, Section (typography), Power (physics), Law, Law and economics, Political science, Economics, Business