K umho Tire v. C armichael

Abstract In the aftermath of the 1993 US Supreme Court decision inDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, departing from the venerable “general acceptance” test for admission of novel scientific evidence and revamping the standards for admissibility of scientifically based forensic evidence, several unanswered questions remained. The most important one was whether the newDaubertstandards requiring proof of reliability also applied to nonscientifcally based expert testimony. Much forensic expert testimony has, traditionally, been based on applied sciences as well as on special skills achieved through experience.Kumho Tire v. Carmichael—hereinafterKumho Tire—answered that question. The decision may be cited by referring to any of the following law reports: 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, or 143 L.Ed. 2 d 238 (1999). InKumho Tire, the Court unequivocally applied theDaubertproof of reliability requirement to all forms of expert testimony. In the process of doing this, the Court nevertheless made certain distinctions between expert opinion testimony based on science, and that based on learned skills, through study or experience, or derived from the application of technological devices. This article explains the history ofKumho Tire, its holding, and its impact on forensic science. Though technically applicable only in US federal courts, the opinion is also adopted as law in many other jurisdictions. It is also discussed in jurisdictions where theKumho Tiretenets are not directly applicable.Kumho Tireis also the subject of many forensic discussions at professional meetings and in commentaries in the peer review literature.