2015•Journal of Religious EthicsRequires access

Aquinas and the Natural Law

Peter Seipel

Abstract

Abstract Recent decades have seen a shift away from the traditional view thatAquinas's theory of the natural law is meant to supply us with normative guidance grounded in a substantive theory of human nature. In the present essay,Iargue that this is a mistake. Expanding on the suggestions ofJeanPorter andRalphMcInerny,Idefend a derivationist reading ofST I‐II,Q. 94,A. 2 according to whichAquinas takes our knowledge of the genuine goods of human life and their proper ordering to one another to be self‐evident only to the wise who are able to discern the truth about ourGod‐given human nature. I then show that this reading provides a better account ofAquinas's view than two recent alternatives:JohnFinnis's brand of inclinationism andDanielMarkNelson's virtue‐based interpretation.

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Key concepts: Mistake, Interpretation (philosophy), Normative, Reading (process), Natural (archaeology), Philosophy, Epistemology, Natural law