2006The Economists VoiceRequires access

Advance Disclosure of Managers' Stock Trades: A Proposal to Improve Executive Compensation

Jesse M. Fried

Open publisher page 8 citations

Abstract

Despite the insider trading laws and Sarbanes-Oxley, Jesse Fried argues that executives still make billions of dollars of insider trading profits each year by timing their stock sales: requiring advance disclosure of such trades would go far to address this problem.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Despite the insider trading laws and Sarbanes-Oxley, Jesse Fried argues that executives still make billions of dollars of insider trading profits each year by timing their stock sales: requiring advance disclosure of such trades would go far to address this problem.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 8 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Despite the insider trading laws and Sarbanes-Oxley, Jesse Fried argues that executives still make billions of dollars of insider trading profits each year by timing their stock sales: requiring advance disclosure of such trades would go far to address this problem.

Key concepts: Insider trading, Insider, Executive compensation, Business, Stock (firearms), Accounting, Compensation (psychology), Stock options

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Advance Disclosure of Managers' Stock Trades: A Proposal to Improve Executive Compensation — Research Paper | ScholarLens