Presidential Authority Over EPA Rulemaking Under the Clean Air Act
Christopher D. Ahlers
Abstract
Christopher D. Ahlers
Abstract
Recent efforts to revise the national ambient air quality standards for ozone have revived the longstanding tension between the EPA Administrator and the President with respect to rulemaking under the Clean Air Act. This article explores the differing views regarding the autonomy of the EPA, from the perspectives of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. The article concludes with an analysis of how Presidential interference with EPA rulemaking may make agency decisions more vulnerable to judicial review.
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Recent efforts to revise the national ambient air quality standards for ozone have revived the longstanding tension between the EPA Administrator and the President with respect to rulemaking under the Clean Air Act. This article explores the differing views regarding the autonomy of the EPA, from the perspectives of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. The article concludes with an analysis of how Presidential interference with EPA rulemaking may make agency decisions more vulnerable to judicial review.
Key concepts: Rulemaking, Clean Air Act, Presidential system, National Ambient Air Quality Standards, Legislature, Political science, Agency (philosophy), Government (linguistics)