Caught in the Middle East: U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1945-1961
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Abstract
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Abstract
Postwar American officials desired - in principle - to promote Arab-Israeli peace in order to stabilize the Middle East. Yet Peter L. Hahn shows how, during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, that desire for peace was not always an American priority, as U.S. leaders consistently gave more weight to their determination to contain the Soviet Union than to their desire to make peace between Israel and its neighbors. U.S. leaders were unable to relinquish responsibilities that became increasingly difficult to fulfill, and they were unable to resolve a dispute that would continue to generate instability for years to come.
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Postwar American officials desired - in principle - to promote Arab-Israeli peace in order to stabilize the Middle East. Yet Peter L. Hahn shows how, during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, that desire for peace was not always an American priority, as U.S. leaders consistently gave more weight to their determination to contain the Soviet Union than to their desire to make peace between Israel and its neighbors. U.S. leaders were unable to relinquish responsibilities that became increasingly difficult to fulfill, and they were unable to resolve a dispute that would continue to generate instability for years to come.
Key concepts: Middle East, Political science, Ancient history, History, Foreign policy, Geography, Law, Politics