On the Emergence of Social Norms
Edward Cartwright
Abstract
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Edward Cartwright
Abstract
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We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We detail the conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences, the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology of agent interaction.
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We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We detail the conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences, the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology of agent interaction.
Key concepts: Conformity, Conformist, Norm (philosophy), Mathematical economics, Microeconomics, Economics, Social psychology, Psychology