Maintaining central bank credibility
Anne Sibert, Stuart E. Weiner
Abstract
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Anne Sibert, Stuart E. Weiner
Abstract
Open-access reader
Central banks around the world potentially face a skeptical public when they announce a commitment to controlling inflation. Some economists have argued that, to enhance credibility, central banks should adopt monetary growth rules or other institutional arrangements. Yet it appears there are no costless solutions to the credibility problem.
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Central banks around the world potentially face a skeptical public when they announce a commitment to controlling inflation. Some economists have argued that, to enhance credibility, central banks should adopt monetary growth rules or other institutional arrangements. Yet it appears there are no costless solutions to the credibility problem.
Key concepts: Credibility, Central bank, Inflation (cosmology), Skepticism, Monetary economics, Inflation targeting, Monetary policy, Face (sociological concept)