2011The Encyclopedia of Christian CivilizationRequires access

Evil, Problem Of

Jacob H. Friesenhahn

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Abstract

Abstract The problem of evil is the logical problem posed by the reality of evil against Christian theism or against theism more generally. A person who poses the problem of evil (and other such challenges) against Christian theism is sometimes called an “atheologian,” one who engages in discourse concerning God in order to demonstrate God's nonexistence. A response to the problem of evil can be a “defense,” an argument for the logical compatibility of belief in God and acknowledgment of the presence of evil, or a “theodicy,” a “justification of God,” that provides possible reasons for why God allows evil. The term “theodicy” was coined by the philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646–1716), one of the most significant figures in the field. One of the many ways in which the problem can be posed is to speak of the tension, if not contradiction, that exists among the following propositions: God is omnipotent; God is omnibenevolent; evil exists. Sometimes a statement of God's omniscience is added to this list. The argument of the atheologian takes up these three propositions, each arguably intrinsic to Christian theism, and makes the following type of argument: if God (as omnipotent) is fully able to eradicate evil, and if God (as omnibenevolent) is fully willing to eradicate evil, then evil ought to be eradicated, that is, ought not be present in our world — yet the world that we know seems full of evil. Therefore, God is either not omnipotent (somehow limited in power) or not omnibenevolent (less than fully willing of the good). The Christian seems faced with four unpalatable alternatives: (1) if God is willing to eliminate evil but cannot, then God is not omnipotent; (2) if God is able to eliminate evil but unwilling, then God is not omnibenevolent; (3) if God is both able and willing to eliminate evil, then evil ought to be eliminated — yet evil is still present in the world as we know it; and (4) if God is neither able nor willing to eliminate evil, then God seems neither omnipotent nor omnibenevolent — thus not really “God” at all. The Christian theist seems pressed to abandon God's omnipotence and/or omnibenevolence. The argument concerning the problem of evil in this basic form may go back to the Greek philosopher Epicurus (c.342–270bc) or one of his followers, such as the Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius (c.100–55bc). The argument from evil is commonly regarded as the strongest of all the arguments that can be made against Christian faith and enjoys a prominent place in debates concerning Christian theology. The argument can be presented as a full, logical disproof of the Christian doctrine of God, or it can be presented (more modestly) as providing strong evidence against belief in the Christian God.

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Abstract The problem of evil is the logical problem posed by the reality of evil against Christian theism or against theism more generally. A person who poses the problem of evil (and other such challenges) against Christian theism is sometimes called an “atheologian,” one who engages in discourse concerning God in order to demonstrate God's nonexistence. A response to the problem of evil can be a “defense,” an argument for the logical compatibility of belief in God and acknowledgment of the presence of evil, or a “theodicy,” a “justification of God,” that provides possible reasons for why God allows evil. The term “theodicy” was coined by the philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646–1716), one of the most significant figures in the field. One of the many ways in which the problem can be posed is to speak of the tension, if not contradiction, that exists among the following propositions: God is omnipotent; God is omnibenevolent; evil exists. Sometimes a statement of God's omniscience is added to this list. The argument of the atheologian takes up these three propositions, each arguably intrinsic to Christian theism, and makes the following type of argument: if God (as omnipotent) is fully able to eradicate evil, and if God (as omnibenevolent) is fully willing to eradicate evil, then evil ought to be eradicated, that is, ought not be present in our world — yet the world that we know seems full of evil. Therefore, God is either not omnipotent (somehow limited in power) or not omnibenevolent (less than fully willing of the good). The Christian seems faced with four unpalatable alternatives: (1) if God is willing to eliminate evil but cannot, then God is not omnipotent; (2) if God is able to eliminate evil but unwilling, then God is not omnibenevolent; (3) if God is both able and willing to eliminate evil, then evil ought to be eliminated — yet evil is still present in the world as we know it; and (4) if God is neither able nor willing to eliminate evil, then God seems neither omnipotent nor omnibenevolent — thus not really “God” at all. The Christian theist seems pressed to abandon God's omnipotence and/or omnibenevolence. The argument concerning the problem of evil in this basic form may go back to the Greek philosopher Epicurus (c.342–270bc) or one of his followers, such as the Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius (c.100–55bc). The argument from evil is commonly regarded as the strongest of all the arguments that can be made against Christian faith and enjoys a prominent place in debates concerning Christian theology. The argument can be presented as a full, logical disproof of the Christian doctrine of God, or it can be presented (more modestly) as providing strong evidence against belief in the Christian God.

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Abstract The problem of evil is the logical problem posed by the reality of evil against Christian theism or against theism more generally. A person who poses the problem of evil (and other such challenges) against Christian theism is sometimes called an “atheologian,” one who engages in discourse concerning God in order to demonstrate God's nonexistence. A response to the problem of evil can be a “defense,” an argument for the logical compatibility of belief in God and acknowledgment of the presence of evil, or a “theodicy,” a “justification of God,” that provides possible reasons for why God allows evil. The term “theodicy” was coined by the philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646–1716), one of the most significant figures in the field. One of the many ways in which the problem can be posed is to speak of the tension, if not contradiction, that exists among the following propositions: God is omnipotent; God is omnibenevolent; evil exists. Sometimes a statement of God's omniscience is added to this list. The argument of the atheologian takes up these three propositions, each arguably intrinsic to Christian theism, and makes the following type of argument: if God (as omnipotent) is fully able to eradicate evil, and if God (as omnibenevolent) is fully willing to eradicate evil, then evil ought to be eradicated, that is, ought not be present in our world — yet the world that we know seems full of evil. Therefore, God is either not omnipotent (somehow limited in power) or not omnibenevolent (less than fully willing of the good). The Christian seems faced with four unpalatable alternatives: (1) if God is willing to eliminate evil but cannot, then God is not omnipotent; (2) if God is able to eliminate evil but unwilling, then God is not omnibenevolent; (3) if God is both able and willing to eliminate evil, then evil ought to be eliminated — yet evil is still present in the world as we know it; and (4) if God is neither able nor willing to eliminate evil, then God seems neither omnipotent nor omnibenevolent — thus not really “God” at all. The Christian theist seems pressed to abandon God's omnipotence and/or omnibenevolence. The argument concerning the problem of evil in this basic form may go back to the Greek philosopher Epicurus (c.342–270bc) or one of his followers, such as the Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius (c.100–55bc). The argument from evil is commonly regarded as the strongest of all the arguments that can be made against Christian faith and enjoys a prominent place in debates concerning Christian theology. The argument can be presented as a full, logical disproof of the Christian doctrine of God, or it can be presented (more modestly) as providing strong evidence against belief in the Christian God.

Key concepts: Theism, Problem of evil, Theodicy, Philosophy, Epistemology, Existence of God, Omniscience, Moral evil

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