2010•Unpublished venueRequires access

Study on Monitoring and Incentive Model for Supply Chain Partnership

X.‐D. Xiang, Mingyue Li

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Abstract

The incentive problem in supply chain with asymmetric information is one of the important research contents. The existing supply chain research results are obtained under the condition that the amount of the principal's information is given, in fact, the amount of the principal's information is optional. Based on this understanding and the previous research results, this paper constructs a new monitoring and incentive model with asymmetric information for supply chain partnership. The paper deepens, extends the supply chain incentive research content and deepens people's understanding of supply chain management .It is helpful for applying the theory of supply chain management.

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What this paper is about

The incentive problem in supply chain with asymmetric information is one of the important research contents. The existing supply chain research results are obtained under the condition that the amount of the principal's information is given, in fact, the amount of the principal's information is optional. Based on this understanding and the previous research results, this paper constructs a new monitoring and incentive model with asymmetric information for supply chain partnership. The paper deepens, extends the supply chain incentive research content and deepens people's understanding of supply chain management .It is helpful for applying the theory of supply chain management.

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Available abstract

The incentive problem in supply chain with asymmetric information is one of the important research contents. The existing supply chain research results are obtained under the condition that the amount of the principal's information is given, in fact, the amount of the principal's information is optional. Based on this understanding and the previous research results, this paper constructs a new monitoring and incentive model with asymmetric information for supply chain partnership. The paper deepens, extends the supply chain incentive research content and deepens people's understanding of supply chain management .It is helpful for applying the theory of supply chain management.

Key concepts: Supply chain, Incentive, General partnership, Principal (computer security), Supply chain management, Business, Demand chain, Service management

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