1997Unpublished venueRequires access

Mine Countermeasures: Tomorrow's Operations -- Today's Implications.

Gary M. Denning

Open publisher page 1 citations

Abstract

Abstract : Among the most cost effective weapons available to Third World nations are naval mines. Naval mines provide a small navy with an asymmetrical means to counter a much larger and more capable navy. As the United States discerned during Desert Storm, naval mines, more than any other weapon encountered, had the potential to deny access to U.S. vital objectives, block U.S. naval power projection, and jeopardize the steady flow of sustainment. The U.S. Naval Services and its MCM force took away several lessons learned from Desert Storm. They have since responded to these lessons by restructuring MCM organization and accelerating its research and development for technological improvements. While these are key takeaways, it remains to be seen whether or not the Naval Services learned the most significant lesson: MCM operations will ultimately fail unless considered as a component of the overall campaign or operational plan. The combatant commander has the ability to correct the greatest MCM deficiency of all right now. His greatest asset to minimize the mine threat is his own operational judgment. If naval expeditionary forces are to successfully dominate tomorrow's littorals, today's combatant commander must integrate MCM operations into his standing plans.

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Abstract : Among the most cost effective weapons available to Third World nations are naval mines. Naval mines provide a small navy with an asymmetrical means to counter a much larger and more capable navy. As the United States discerned during Desert Storm, naval mines, more than any other weapon encountered, had the potential to deny access to U.S. vital objectives, block U.S. naval power projection, and jeopardize the steady flow of sustainment. The U.S. Naval Services and its MCM force took away several lessons learned from Desert Storm. They have since responded to these lessons by restructuring MCM organization and accelerating its research and development for technological improvements. While these are key takeaways, it remains to be seen whether or not the Naval Services learned the most significant lesson: MCM operations will ultimately fail unless considered as a component of the overall campaign or operational plan. The combatant commander has the ability to correct the greatest MCM deficiency of all right now. His greatest asset to minimize the mine threat is his own operational judgment. If naval expeditionary forces are to successfully dominate tomorrow's littorals, today's combatant commander must integrate MCM operations into his standing plans.

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Available abstract

Abstract : Among the most cost effective weapons available to Third World nations are naval mines. Naval mines provide a small navy with an asymmetrical means to counter a much larger and more capable navy. As the United States discerned during Desert Storm, naval mines, more than any other weapon encountered, had the potential to deny access to U.S. vital objectives, block U.S. naval power projection, and jeopardize the steady flow of sustainment. The U.S. Naval Services and its MCM force took away several lessons learned from Desert Storm. They have since responded to these lessons by restructuring MCM organization and accelerating its research and development for technological improvements. While these are key takeaways, it remains to be seen whether or not the Naval Services learned the most significant lesson: MCM operations will ultimately fail unless considered as a component of the overall campaign or operational plan. The combatant commander has the ability to correct the greatest MCM deficiency of all right now. His greatest asset to minimize the mine threat is his own operational judgment. If naval expeditionary forces are to successfully dominate tomorrow's littorals, today's combatant commander must integrate MCM operations into his standing plans.

Key concepts: Business, Computer security, Computer science, Operations management, Engineering

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