2001RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsRequires access

An Equilibrium for Games Played by Imperfect Organizations

Kfir Eliaz

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Abstract

This paper argues that when organizations are imperfect in the sense that members may make mistakes and messages may be distorted, then the inner structure of the organization should be explicitly modeled. This paper proposes a framework for studying games between imperfect organizations.

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This paper argues that when organizations are imperfect in the sense that members may make mistakes and messages may be distorted, then the inner structure of the organization should be explicitly modeled. This paper proposes a framework for studying games between imperfect organizations.

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Available abstract

This paper argues that when organizations are imperfect in the sense that members may make mistakes and messages may be distorted, then the inner structure of the organization should be explicitly modeled. This paper proposes a framework for studying games between imperfect organizations.

Key concepts: Imperfect, Perfect information, Computer science, Mathematical economics, Microeconomics, Economics, Philosophy, Linguistics

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