2012•SSRN Electronic JournalOpen access

Adverse Selection and Private Health Insurance Coverage in India - A Rational Behaviour Model of Insurance Agents Under Asymmetric Information

Sukumar Vellakkal

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Key concepts: Adverse selection, Actuarial science, Private information retrieval, Health insurance, Business, Information asymmetry, Auto insurance risk selection, Group insurance

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Adverse Selection and Private Health Insurance Coverage in India - A Rational Behaviour Model of Insurance Agents Under Asymmetric Information — Research Paper | ScholarLens