2003•RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsRequires access

A necessary and sufficient condition for Wilson's impossibility theorem with strict non-imposition

Yasuhito Tanaka

Open publisher page 1 citations

Abstract

Wilson's impossibility theorem (Wilson(1972)) about Arrovian social welfare functions (Arrow(1963)) states that there exists a dictator or an inverse-dictator for any non-null social welfare function which satisfies the conditions of unrestricted domain, non-imposition and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Among these conditions IIA is very strong and controversial. We will show that, under the condition of strict non-imposition which is stronger than non-imposition, IIA can be replaced by weaker condition. We call this condition "monotonicity". We will also show that under strict non-imposition it is necessary and sufficient condition for Wilson''s theorem, that is, it is equivalent to dictatorship or inverse-dictatorship of Arrovian social welfare functions under unrestricted domain and strict non-imposition.

Open-access reader

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Wilson's impossibility theorem (Wilson(1972)) about Arrovian social welfare functions (Arrow(1963)) states that there exists a dictator or an inverse-dictator for any non-null social welfare function which satisfies the conditions of unrestricted domain, non-imposition and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Among these conditions IIA is very strong and controversial. We will show that, under the condition of strict non-imposition which is stronger than non-imposition, IIA can be replaced by weaker condition. We call this condition "monotonicity". We will also show that under strict non-imposition it is necessary and sufficient condition for Wilson''s theorem, that is, it is equivalent to dictatorship or inverse-dictatorship of Arrovian social welfare functions under unrestricted domain and strict non-imposition.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 1 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Wilson's impossibility theorem (Wilson(1972)) about Arrovian social welfare functions (Arrow(1963)) states that there exists a dictator or an inverse-dictator for any non-null social welfare function which satisfies the conditions of unrestricted domain, non-imposition and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Among these conditions IIA is very strong and controversial. We will show that, under the condition of strict non-imposition which is stronger than non-imposition, IIA can be replaced by weaker condition. We call this condition "monotonicity". We will also show that under strict non-imposition it is necessary and sufficient condition for Wilson''s theorem, that is, it is equivalent to dictatorship or inverse-dictatorship of Arrovian social welfare functions under unrestricted domain and strict non-imposition.

Key concepts: Dictator, Arrow's impossibility theorem, Social welfare function, Independence of irrelevant alternatives, Impossibility, Mathematical economics, Social choice theory, Dictatorship

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
A necessary and sufficient condition for Wilson's impossibility theorem with strict non-imposition — Research Paper | ScholarLens