2007RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsOpen access

COOPERATIVE GAMES: CORE AND SHAPLEY VALUE

Roberto Serrano

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Abstract

This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative game theory.

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This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative game theory.

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Available abstract

This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative game theory.

Key concepts: Shapley value, Cooperative game theory, Core (optical fiber), Mathematical economics, Bondareva–Shapley theorem, Game theory, Solution concept, Transferable utility

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