Preparing for the Perception War: Why a Better Public Affairs Program is Important to the Operational Commander
Kenneth M. Pascal
Abstract
Kenneth M. Pascal
Abstract
During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) the military experienced unprecedented levels of press coverage. New methods of handling the media, such as embedding reporters with individual units, were lauded by many as a tremendous success. To some it seemed as though the historical problems of distrust and censorship had been solved, and this war marked a new era of cooperation between the military and the media. This paper addresses lessons learned from OIF in terms of how well the military managed media relations, both during and after the conflict. It argues that theater military commanders lacked the resources to properly seize the initiative in a concurrent war of public perception, especially after the termination of "major operations". To support this thesis, the paper describes inherent shortcomings in the military Public Affairs (PA) programs, and how its employment was flawed throughout the conflict. It also examines the potential risk of mingling PA functions with military deception efforts and other forms of Information Operations. Lastly, this paper provides recommendations for the operational commander to better prepare for the "perception war" that inevitably accompanies military operations.
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During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) the military experienced unprecedented levels of press coverage. New methods of handling the media, such as embedding reporters with individual units, were lauded by many as a tremendous success. To some it seemed as though the historical problems of distrust and censorship had been solved, and this war marked a new era of cooperation between the military and the media. This paper addresses lessons learned from OIF in terms of how well the military managed media relations, both during and after the conflict. It argues that theater military commanders lacked the resources to properly seize the initiative in a concurrent war of public perception, especially after the termination of "major operations". To support this thesis, the paper describes inherent shortcomings in the military Public Affairs (PA) programs, and how its employment was flawed throughout the conflict. It also examines the potential risk of mingling PA functions with military deception efforts and other forms of Information Operations. Lastly, this paper provides recommendations for the operational commander to better prepare for the "perception war" that inevitably accompanies military operations.
Key concepts: Perception, Political science, Aeronautics, Operations research, Public administration, Public relations, Psychology, Engineering