Nash equilibrium in the game of transmission expansion
Ji Xingquan, Wang Chengshan
Abstract
Ji Xingquan, Wang Chengshan
Abstract
Transmission investment tends to be increasingly decentralized, and each participant's strategy is interactional in today's power market environment. It is very important for system administrators and each participant to correctly forecast potential investors' actions. This paper analyzes transmission investors' mixed strategy Nash equilibrium based on noncooperative game theory and genetic algorithm.
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Transmission investment tends to be increasingly decentralized, and each participant's strategy is interactional in today's power market environment. It is very important for system administrators and each participant to correctly forecast potential investors' actions. This paper analyzes transmission investors' mixed strategy Nash equilibrium based on noncooperative game theory and genetic algorithm.
Key concepts: Nash equilibrium, Game theory, Transmission (telecommunications), Investment (military), Computer science, Mathematical economics, Equilibrium selection, Evolutionarily stable strategy