2011BYU Law Library (Brigham Young University)Open access

Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws

D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, Marcus Hintze

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Abstract

In this Article, we propose legal reforms to empower shareholders in public corporations. Currently,most shareholders participate in corporate governance in three ways: they vote, they sell, and they sue. We would expand the menu for shareholders in public corporations by enabling them to contract using shareholder bylaws. We contend that such private ordering will improve shareholder monitoring of managers and create laboratories of corporate governance that benefit the entire corporate governance system.

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In this Article, we propose legal reforms to empower shareholders in public corporations. Currently,most shareholders participate in corporate governance in three ways: they vote, they sell, and they sue. We would expand the menu for shareholders in public corporations by enabling them to contract using shareholder bylaws. We contend that such private ordering will improve shareholder monitoring of managers and create laboratories of corporate governance that benefit the entire corporate governance system.

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Available abstract

In this Article, we propose legal reforms to empower shareholders in public corporations. Currently,most shareholders participate in corporate governance in three ways: they vote, they sell, and they sue. We would expand the menu for shareholders in public corporations by enabling them to contract using shareholder bylaws. We contend that such private ordering will improve shareholder monitoring of managers and create laboratories of corporate governance that benefit the entire corporate governance system.

Key concepts: Shareholder, Corporate governance, Business, Accounting, Shareholder resolution, Shareholder loan, Corporate law, Finance

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