Soviet Unconventional Conflict Policies and Strategies in the Third World

Not surprisingly, the United States and the Soviet Union were fre­ quently involved in these conflicts. The United States was involved directly in at least 22 major conflicts in the Third World between 1960 and 1987, and the Soviet Union participated in at least 25 during the same period.3 In at least eighteen instances, both the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in the same major conflict, almost always supporting different sides.4 Many additional minor conflicts have also taken place. If U.S. and Soviet involvement in minor conflicts in the Third World, such as U.S. support for the Bolivian government in its eventually successful effort to end Che Guevara's insurgency and Soviet support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in its effort to overthrow Oman's government, are included, the scope of superpower involvement in conflicts in the Third World far surpasses even those figures presented above. Given the frequency of superpower involvement in unconventiona l Third World conflicts, it is understandable that many policy-makers and analysts in the West have sought to dissect and understand the forces that lead to and influence that involvement.5 This study follows in that tradi­ tion and seeks both to provide an understanding of Soviet conceptions of in the Third World and to analyze actual Soviet policies and strategies in Third World conflicts. SOVIET CONCEPTIONS OF UNCONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE THIRD WORLD The Kremlin has been and remains extremely concerned about and interested in both U.S. and Soviet policies in the Third World, and about the role of both superpowers in conventional and con­ flict there.' Unfortunately, however, any analysis of Soviet conceptions of in the Third World is complicated by the sim­ ple fact that the Soviets reject unconventional conflict as an analytical tool. Further, they decry as unacceptable and misleading both lowintensity conflict (LIC) and counter-terrorism, two of the major subsets of unconventiona l conflict. The reasons that the Kremlin takes these positions require further clarification.