2004•Rivista di Politica EconomicaRequires access

Mutual Advantages of Coercion and Exit within Private Clubs and Treaty Organizations: Towards a Logic of Voluntary Association

Roger D. Congleton

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Abstract

Treaty organizations, like other clubs, attempt to solve problems that can more effectively be addressed collectively than independently. In order to address these problems, a club's leadership may be granted coercive power of various kinds. In ordinary clubs, coercive power is simply the right to exclude those who fail to pay their dues for club services. In other more coercive clubs, leaders might be given the power to penalize individual members for shirking as a means of solving free rider and coordination problems of various kinds.

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What this paper is about

Treaty organizations, like other clubs, attempt to solve problems that can more effectively be addressed collectively than independently. In order to address these problems, a club's leadership may be granted coercive power of various kinds. In ordinary clubs, coercive power is simply the right to exclude those who fail to pay their dues for club services. In other more coercive clubs, leaders might be given the power to penalize individual members for shirking as a means of solving free rider and coordination problems of various kinds.

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OpenAlex reports 6 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

Treaty organizations, like other clubs, attempt to solve problems that can more effectively be addressed collectively than independently. In order to address these problems, a club's leadership may be granted coercive power of various kinds. In ordinary clubs, coercive power is simply the right to exclude those who fail to pay their dues for club services. In other more coercive clubs, leaders might be given the power to penalize individual members for shirking as a means of solving free rider and coordination problems of various kinds.

Key concepts: Coercion (linguistics), Club, Power (physics), Treaty, Order (exchange), Voluntary association, Association (psychology), Law and economics

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