Access by State Attorneys General to Federal Grand Jury Antitrust Investigative Materials
Bruce Maximov
Abstract
Bruce Maximov
Abstract
Section 4F(b) of the Clayton Act' requires the Attorney General of the United States to assist state enforcement of the antitrust laws by providing state attorneys general with federal investigative materials relevant to antitrust actions brought or being considered by the states. The Ninth Circuit recently became the first federal appellate court to consider the application of that provision to traditionally secret grand jury materials. In United States v. B.EF Goodrich Co.,2 the court ruled that section 4F(b) authorizes the release of such materials to state attorneys general without the ordinarily required showing of a compelling and particularized need for such access.3 B.F Goodrich was soon followed by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp.4 Other courts, however, have reached contrary results.5 This Article addresses the issues raised by these conflicting decisions. Part I reviews the presumption of secrecy that attaches to grand jury proceedings and the extent to which disclosure has been permitted, principally for access under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.6 Part II explores the merits of the argument that section
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Section 4F(b) of the Clayton Act' requires the Attorney General of the United States to assist state enforcement of the antitrust laws by providing state attorneys general with federal investigative materials relevant to antitrust actions brought or being considered by the states. The Ninth Circuit recently became the first federal appellate court to consider the application of that provision to traditionally secret grand jury materials. In United States v. B.EF Goodrich Co.,2 the court ruled that section 4F(b) authorizes the release of such materials to state attorneys general without the ordinarily required showing of a compelling and particularized need for such access.3 B.F Goodrich was soon followed by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp.4 Other courts, however, have reached contrary results.5 This Article addresses the issues raised by these conflicting decisions. Part I reviews the presumption of secrecy that attaches to grand jury proceedings and the extent to which disclosure has been permitted, principally for access under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.6 Part II explores the merits of the argument that section
Key concepts: Law, Jury, Ninth, Presumption, Secrecy, Political science, State (computer science), Enforcement