Practicality of diversion path analysis

One can define the safeguards system for nuclear material as the set of all protective actions taken to prevent or to deter attempts to divert nuclear material to unauthorized use" Maintenance of effective safeguards requires a program for routine assessment of plant safeguards systems in terms of their capabilities to satisfy safeguards aims.Plant internal control systems provide capabilities for detection of unprevented diversion and can provide assurance that diversion has not occurred.A procedure called Diversion Path Analysis (DPA) enables routine assessment of the capabilities of internal control systems in this regard and identification of safeguards problem areas in a plant.A framework for safeguards system design is also provided which will allow flexibility to accommodate individual plant circumstances while maintaining acceptable diversion detection capability.The steps of the procedure are described and the practicality of the analytical method is shown by referring to a demonstration test for a high throughput process where plant personnel were major participants.The boundary con- ditions for the demonstration case are given, along with some conclusions about the general procedure. * Work supported by