Beyond the Illusion of Symmetry: How to Think about Arms Control

Abstract : Examines the historical divergence in US and Soviet approaches to nuclear arms control and its implications for future nuclear force reduction agreements. The study questions arms controls 'illusion of symmetry' and its simplistic assumptions about each side's motivations and objective for arms control. The study outlines the changing context for arms control, identifies the traditional goals of arms control, measures both sides arms control' behavior' against those goals, interprets some of the criticisms of arms control in light of this analysis and offers some suggested improvements for future arms control efforts. The author concludes that US and Soviet arms control interests have always been asymmetrical and, consequently, US arms control efforts are unnecessarily constrained by an illusion of symmetry. As a result, US arms negotiations planners and strategists are likely missing some excellent opportunities for reducing arms while improving US national security. He recommends moving beyond the 'illusion of symmetry' to a broad and integrated national strategy of arms control initiatives.