The Time Is Right-Or Is It? the Supreme Court Speaks in Ledbetter V. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co

ABSTRACT In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an employee may not sue their employer under Title VII unless they have filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days after the alleged employment practice occurred (Ledbetter). majority opinion, written by Justice Alito, will likely bar many of the 40,000 pay cases brought between 2001 and 2006. In her scathing dissent, read aloud from the bench, Justice Ginsburg invited Congress to overturn the decision, stating that The court does not comprehend, or is indifferent to, the insidious way in which women can be victims of pay discrimination (Ledbetter). FACTS plaintiff, Lilly Ledbetter (Ledbetter), began her career at Goodyear Tire and Rubber (Goodyear) in 1979. For most of her twenty year career at Goodyear, Ledbetter was the only female manager. Initially, Ledbetter's salary was the same as that of the male managers. However, over time, Ledbetter's salary slipped relative to that of the male managers. By 1997, Ledbetter was not only the sole woman manager, she was also the lowest paid manager. Ledbetter's monthly salary at the time of her departure was approximately $3,700 per month. Similarly situated male managers at Goodyear made between $4,200 and $5,200 per month. In 1998, Ledbetter filed an administrative claim of with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She alleged that Goodyear violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by paying her a lower salary because of her sex. Ledbetter's claim eventually went to a jury who found in her favor. District Court (in Alabama) entered judgment for Ledbetter for back pay, damages, attorney fees, and costs. APPEAL Goodyear appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and the victory for Ledbetter was reversed. Eleventh Circuit, quoting Title VII, held that her claim was time-barred. Title VII provides that a charge of shall be filed within [180] days after the alleged employment practice occurred . . . Ledbetter charged, and proved at trial, that within the 180-day period, her pay was substantially less than the pay of men doing the same work. Further, she introduced evidence sufficient to establish that against female managers at the Gadsden plant, not performance inadequacies on her part, accounted for the pay differential (Ledbetter). Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit found the evidence unavailing, holding that Ledbetter should have filed charges year-by-year, each time Goodyear failed to increase her salary commensurate with the salaries of male peers. Any annual pay decision not contested immediately (within 180 days). . . [is] a fait accompli beyond the province of Title VII ever to repair(Ledbetter). U.S. SUPREME COURT REVIEW U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 decision was written by Justice Alito. Justice Alito describes the case as one that calls upon us to apply established precedent in a slightly different context(Ledbetter). Justice Ginsburg' s dissent, however, frames the issue as one with two possible responses to the question What activity qualifies as an employment practice in cases of with respect to compensation? (Ledbetter). One response (the one chosen by the majority) is to answer that the pay-setting decision alone is the unlawful practice. Under this scenario, each pay-setting decision is discrete and separate from subsequent decisions. As such, each discrete act of pay-setting would necessarily have to be challenged within 180 days of the date of the decision. After that 180 day period has ended, any claim of has been forfeited. A second response, and the one argued from the bench by Justice Ginsburg, is that both the pay-setting decision, and the actual payment of a discriminatory wage, are practices. …